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Abstract
We consider an overlapping generations model with public edu-
cation and social security where the overall size of these policies is
determined in a repeated voting game. We investigate the interaction
between the politically determined policies and economic development
in a Markov perfect equilibrium. The following results are obtained.
First, the level of human capital determines whether these policies are
sustained in the Markov perfect equilibrium. Second, if the level of
initial human capital is suciently high, human capital grows forever.
In contrast, if the level of initial human capital is low, the economy
might be caught in a poverty trap.
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1 Introduction
In nearly every country, the government provides public education. Public
education contributes to the accumulation of human capital, and thus, a
large body of literature investigates its eects on economic development 1.
In addition to its impact on economic development, public education has
another important feature: it is considered to be a redistribution policy from
old generations to young ones, because it imposes upon parents expenditure
on their children's education.
In democratic countries, the size of public policies is determined through
political processes. Whether public education is politically sustained depends
on the degree of parents' altruism toward their children. If individuals are
non-altruistic and do not care about their children, they have no incentive
to bear the cost of education, and public education is unlikely to be sup-
ported. In such a situation, how can we make public education politically
sustainable? How far does its political sustainability depend on the economic
environment? Furthermore, how does politically determined public educa-
tion aect the process of economic development? This paper is motivated by
these questions.
In this paper, we adopt a pay-as-you-go social security system that redis-
tributes income from young generations to old ones as a political means to
sustain public education. If the government implements pay-as-you-go social
security combines with public education, parents might support public edu-
cation, as it raises their children's productivity and would increase parents'
social security benets. In this paper, we consider a situation where the over-
all size of public education and pay-as-you-go social security is determined
in a political process. Furthermore, to investigate in a simple manner the
interaction between politically determined public policies and economic de-
velopment, we focus on a Markov perfect equilibrium as a politico-economic
equilibrium.
The importance of the interaction between public education and pay-as-
you-go social security is recognized, and hence, many studies analyze situa-
tions where these policies coexist. Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999) consider a
situation where the government allocates tax revenue between public educa-
tion and social security, and they investigate the eects of the allocation rules
1de la Croix and Michel (2002) survey the recent literature investigating the eects of
public education in overlapping generations economies.
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on economic development. Boldrin and Montes (2005) investigate the role
of these policies from the viewpoint of economic eciency. In both studies,
however, the size of these policies is given exogenously, and thus, it remains
to be considered how the size of these policies is determined.
Some authors investigate the size of these policies in political economies.
Kemnitz (2000) considers a situation where individuals aect the decisions
of the government through voting and lobbying activities. In his paper,
however, it is assumed that the government does not take into considera-
tion any eect that current policies might have on future policies. Rangel
(2003) analyzes the interaction between forward intergenerational goods (for
instance, public education) and backward intergenerational goods (such as
social security) in a repeated voting game. He shows that the backward in-
tergenerational goods are necessary to sustain the forward intergenerational
goods in politico-economic equilibria.
Rangel (2003) adopts trigger strategies as individuals' voting strategies,
and thus there are numerous subgame perfect equilibria. Therefore it is di-
cult to predict the degree to which public policies are politically implemented
2. In contrast to his study, in this paper we focus on a Markov perfect equi-
librium. In the Markov perfect equilibrium, the size of public policies is
represented as a function of the state variable of the economy, and hence, we
can explicitly investigate the following questions:
1. How does the size of public policies depend on the economic environ-
ment in the politico-economic equilibrium?
2. How do the politically determined public policies aect the process of
economic development?
We consider a simple overlapping generations economy where individuals
with non-altruistic preferences live for three periods (young, middle and old).
They receive public education when young, pay lump-sum tax when middle,
and receive social security benets when old. The population size of each
generation grows at a constant and positive rate. We assume a small open
economy, and focus on the accumulation of human capital as an engine of
2Assuming heterogeneity in each generation, Poutvaara (2006) analyzes the charac-
teristics of public education and social security in the policico-economic equilibria. He
also adopts trigger strategies, and thus, in his study there are numerous subgame perfect
equilibria.
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economic development. A child's human capital depends on public educa-
tion and parental human capital. Furthermore, we assume that there exists
complementarity between these factors. That is, the marginal productivity
of public education expenditure increases with parental human capital. The
government allocates tax revenue between public education expenditure for
the young and social security benets for the old. The size of lump-sum tax
is determined in a repeated majority voting game where only the middle and
the old are given voting rights. Since the rate of population growth is as-
sumed to be positive, the majority in the voting game are the middle in each
period. When voting, the middle takes into account the fact that current
lump-sum tax will aect social security benets in the next period. In our
model, human capital is the only state variable, and hence, the overall size of
public policies is represented as a function of human capital in the Markov
perfect equilibrium. In such a set-up, we obtain the following results.
1. When the level of human capital is suciently high, public education
and social security are sustained in the Markov perfect equilibrium,
because the marginal productivity of public education is suciently
high and hence, there exists a benet to support these policies. In
contrast, when the level of human capital is low, these policies cannot
be sustained because of the low marginal productivity of education.
2. When the level of the initial human capital is suciently high, these
policies continue to be sustained, and thus, human capital grows for-
ever. In contrast, when the level of the initial human capital is low,
these policies cannot be sustained, and hence, the economy might be
caught in a poverty trap.
Lastly, we briey analyze the eects of a decline in the rate of population
growth on the sustainability of public policies and the pattern of economic
development. This would raise the productivity of public education and
increase the likelihood that public policies would continue to be politically
sustained, implying that a declining birth rate might be a necessary condition
for long-run economic development.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we describe the basic
structure of the model and then characterize the competitive equilibrium.
In section 3, we consider the repeated voting game and analyze the charac-
teristics of the politico-economic equilibrium. We present our conclusions in
section 4. Appendix gives the proof of proposition 1.
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2 The competitive equilibrium
The basic environment
We consider a small open overlapping generations economy where individuals
live for three periods (young, middle and old). Within each generation,
individuals are homogeneous. We denote by Nt the size of population born
in period t. The population of each generation grows at a constant and
positive rate n > 0. This implies that Nt+1 = (1 + n)Nt.
Firms
Production take place according to neoclassical production technology using
physical and human capital. The production technology is represented as a
constant returns to scale production function
Y = F (K;H) = f()H;   K
H
;
where Y is output, K and H are inputs of physical and human capital respec-
tively. The function f is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and satises the
Inada conditions. All markets are competitive. The competitive equilibrium
conditions imply that
R = f 0(t); (1)
wt = f(t)  f 0(t)t; (2)
where R is the world interest rate and wt is the wage rate per unit of human
capital. From (1) and (2), we obtain,
t = (f
0) 1(R)  ;
wt = f()  f 0()  w:
Therefore, the wage rate is constant over time.
Individuals
Individuals are non-altruistic and draw utility from consumption when mid-
dle and old. Each individual born in period t   1 has the following utility
function:
U(c1t; c2t+1) = u(c1t) + u(c2t+1);  2 (0; 1);
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where c1t and c2t+1 are consumption when middle and old, respectively, and
 is the discount factor. Consumption when young is ignored for simplicity.
The instantaneous utility function u is strictly increasing, strictly concave,
and satises the Inada conditions.
When young, individuals are educated in the public education system and
accumulate human capital. In this period, they make no decisions. When
middle, they supply human capital inelastically and earn the wage. In this
period, lump-sum tax is levied on them. They allocate their disposable
income between consumption and savings:
c1t + st = wht   t;
where st is savings, ht is human capital, and t is lump-sum tax. When old,
they retire and consume the proceeds of their savings and social security
benets:
c2t+1 = Rst + bt+1;
where bt+1 is the social security benet. Their intertemporal budget con-
straint is
c1t +
c2t+1
R
= wht   t + bt+1
R
: (3)
The right-hand side of (3) represents their lifetime income. Individuals choose
consumption and savings in order to maximize their utility subject to their
intertemporal budget constraint, taking ht; w;R; t and bt+1 as given. Since
they can save or borrow freely, their indirect utility is a strictly increasing
function of their lifetime income.
Government
In each period, the government levies lump-sum tax on the middle. The
government allocates tax revenue between public education and social secu-
rity. Because individuals are homogeneous within each generation, neither
the social security nor the public education redistributes income intragener-
ationally. We denote by x 2 [0; 1] the fraction of tax revenue allocated to
public education. The budget constraints of the government are
Ntet = xNt 1t;
Nt 2bt = (1  x)Nt 1t;
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where et is per capita public education expenditure. From the budget con-
straints, we obtain
et =
x
1 + n
t; (4)
bt = (1  x)(1 + n)t: (5)
Throughout this paper, we assume that the fraction x is xed over time 3.
Human Capital Production
A child's human capital depends on public education and parental human
capital. We assume a Stone-Geary type human capital production function
represented as
ht+1 = G(et; ht) = (et + )
h1 t ;  > 0;  2 (0; 1): (6)
This specication has the following features:
G(0; h) = h1  > 0; (7)
@2G
@h@e
(e; h) = (1  ) G(e; h)
(e+ )h
> 0; (8)
lim
e!0
@G
@e
(e; h) = 

h

1 
<1: (9)
Equation (7) implies that even if there is no public education, a child's human
capital cannot be zero. Equation (8) implies complementarity between public
education and parental human capital. That is, the marginal productivity
of public education is increasing in parental human capital. Equation (9)
implies that the production function does not satisfy the Inada condition.
That is, even if public education expenditure is close to zero, the marginal
productivity of public education remains nite.
From (4) and (6), a child's human capital is represented as a function of
the lump-sum tax levied on parental generation and parental human capital:
ht+1 =

x
1 + n
t + 

h1 t  G^(t; ht): (10)
3The eect of a change in the fraction x on the politico-economic equilibrium is inves-
tigated in Section 3.
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3 The politico-economic equilibrium
In this section, we investigate characteristics of the politico-economic equi-
librium. We are interested in the political sustainability of public policies,
and hence assume that the size of lump-sum tax, that is, the overall size of
public policies, is determined in a majority voting game in each period. In
many countries, young educated individuals do not participate in elections,
and thus, we assume that voting rights are applicable only to the middle and
the old.
In contrast to previous literature, we focus on a Markov perfect equilib-
rium. This enables us to investigate explicitly how the size of public policies
depends on the economic environment in the politico-economic equilibrium,
and furthermore, how public policies aect the process of economic devel-
opment. As human capital is the only state variable, in the Markov perfect
equilibrium, lump-sum tax in period t depends on human capital in period
t:
t = (ht):
Individuals vote on the size of current lump-sum tax to maximize their life-
time income. When voting, they take into account the fact that the current
lump-sum tax aects the level of human capital of their children, and thus,
might aect the social security benets in the next period.
The rate of population growth is assumed to be positive, and hence, the
majority in the voting game are the middle in each period. Therefore, we
analyze the voting behavior of the middle. The lifetime income of the middle
in period t is
V (t; ht) = wht   t + 1
g
(ht+1)
= wht   t + 1
g
 [G^(t; ht)];
(11)
where g  R=[(1 x)(1+n)]. The Markov perfect equilibrium tax function
(h) must satisfy the following functional equation
(h) = argmax
0wh

wh   + 1
g
 [G^(; h)]

: (12)
The rst order condition of the optimization problem is
 1 + 1
g
 0[G^(; h)]
@G^
@
(; h)  0: (13)
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The rst term of the left-hand side of (13) represents the cost of increasing
current lump-sum tax, which results from the reduction of the disposable
income of the middle. In contrast, the second term represents the benet
of increasing current lump-sum tax. An increase in current lump-sum tax
implies an increase in children's human capital, which implies an increase in
social security benets in the next period.
In our set-up, there exist multiple Markov perfect equilibria. For instance,
if lump-sum-tax and social security benets did not exist in the next period,
the middle would not have any incentive to support public policies in the
current period. Therefore the situation where lump-sum tax is represented
as
8h > 0 : (h) = 0
is a Markov perfect equilibrium. However, this equilibrium is obviously un-
interesting. In this paper, we focus on a situation where lump-sum tax is
represented as a quasi linear function of human capital in the Markov perfect
equilibrium, to make the model tractable and obtain some interesting results.
On the Markov perfect equilibrium, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. If the parameters satisfy
0 < x < 1; 1 < g <
1

;
(1 + n)g
1

x
< w;
there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium where lump-sum tax is represented
as
(h) =
(
0 if 0  h  
^(h)  1+n
x

g
1
h  

if h > 
; (14)
where
  
g
1


1  

1
g
  1

> 0:
Proof. See Appendix.
The equilibrium tax function given by (14) has the following features.
First, when the level of human capital is suciently high, the equilibrium
tax is positive and is represented as an increasing linear function of human
capital. The intuition is as follows. Suppose that the equilibrium tax function
in the next period is a linear increasing function of human capital:
 0 = 1 + 2G^(; h);
9
where 1 and 2 > 0 are constant variables. From (13), the cost and the
benet of increasing current lump-sum tax are respectively
C(; h) = 1;
B(; h) =
2
g
@G^
@
(; h):
The cost is independent of the level of human capital. In contrast, because of
the complementarity between public education and parental human capital,
the benet is increasing in human capital:
@B
@h
(; h) =
2
g
@2G^
@h@
(; h) > 0:
The higher the level of human capital, the larger the current lump-sum tax
equalizing the cost with the benet. In fact, by solving the equation C(; h) =
B(; h) with respect to  , we obtain a linear increasing function of human
capital (see (10)). Therefore the equilibrium lump-sum tax increases linearly
with human capital.
Second, when the level of human capital is low, the equilibrium lump-
sum tax is zero, and thus public policies cannot be sustained. If the level
of human capital is low, the benet of increasing current lump-sum tax is
extremely low, and there is no positive current lump-sum tax to equalize the
cost with the benet.
Proposition 1 implies that if the government allocates tax revenue to
both public education and pay-as-you-go social security (i.e., 0 < x < 1),
these policies can be politically sustained. However, can public education
or pay-as-you-go social security be politically sustained in isolation? Here
we consider two situations. The rst case is one in which the government
allocates all the tax revenue to social security benets (i.e., x = 0). In this
case, current lump-sum tax does not contribute to the accumulation of chil-
dren's human capital, and thus, does not aect the size of social security
benets in the next period. As a result, there is no benet from increasing
the lump-sum tax. Hence, the social security system, in isolation, cannot
be sustained in any Markov perfect equilibrium 4. The second case is one
4We assume a small open economy, and thus, the size of public policies does not aect
the return of savings. In contrast to this paper, Forni (2005) assumes a closed economy
and analyzes characteristics of social security in Markov perfect equilibria. In the closed
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in which the government allocates all the tax revenue to public education
expenditure (i.e., x = 1). In this case, there is apparently no benet from
increasing current lump-sum tax. Thus the public education system, in isola-
tion, cannot be sustained in any Markov perfect equilibrium 5. These results
are summarized in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. If the government allocates all the tax revenue to social secu-
rity benets, social security cannot be sustained in any Markov perfect equilib-
rium. If it allocates all the tax revenue to public education, public education
cannot be sustained in any Markov equilibrium.
4 Patterns of Economic Development in the
Markov Perfect Equilibrium
In this section, we analyze the patterns of economic development in the
Markov perfect equilibrium described in Proposition 1. By substituting (h)
of (14) into (10), we obtain the dynamic equation of the equilibrium human
capital:
ht+1 =

J1(ht)  h1 t if 0  ht  
J2(ht)  ght if ht >  : (15)
When the level of human capital is below , public policies cannot be sus-
tained, and human capital is accumulated according to the function J1. In
contrast, when the level of human capital is above , these policies are sus-
tained, and human capital is accumulated according to the function J2.
Patterns of economic development depend on exogenous parameters. Fig-
ure 1(a) depicts the pattern of human capital accumulation when  < . Note
that  is the threshold of human capital whether or not public policies are
politically sustained. In this case, there exists a locally stable steady state
h = , in which public policies do not exist.
If the level of the initial human capital is below , human capital mono-
tonically converges to the steady state. On the transition path, public policies
cannot be sustained in the political process, and the economy is caught in
a poverty trap. If the level of the initial human capital is above , public
economy, an increase in the level of social security reduces the level of savings, raising the
return of savings (general equilibrium eect). This eect makes social security politically
sustainable.
5This result is similar to that of Rangel (2003).
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Figure 1: (a) and (b) depict the pattern of the equilibrium human capital
accumulation when  <  and when  >  respectively.
policies continue to be sustained, and human capital grows forever at the
rate of g.
Figure 1(b) depicts the pattern of human capital accumulation when  >
. In this case, there is no steady state and the process of human capital
accumulation is dierent from that of the above case. Even if the level of
the initial human capital is below , human capital grows without public
education, and at some period, the level of human capital becomes higher
than . After that period, public policies are sustained, and human capital
grows forever.
These results are summarized in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. The process of human capital accumulation in the Markov
perfect equilibrium described in proposition 1 is given by (15). Patterns of
economic development depend on the exogenous parameters.
 When  < , the economy with h0 <  is caught in poverty trap,
whereas the economy with h0 >  grows forever.
 When  > , even if the level of the initial human capital is below ,
the economy grows forever.
Lastly, we analyze the eects of exogenous parameters, especially the rate
of population growth n and the fraction of tax revenue allocated to public
education x, on the pattern of human capital accumulation. To this end, we
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rst investigate how these parameters aect the threshold . By a simple
calculation, the threshold  is shown to be increasing in the rate of population
growth n:
@
@n
=
@
@g
@g
@n
=
R
(1  )(1  x)(1 + n)2g 1+

1
g
+
1
g
  1

> 0:
A decline in population growth has a positive eect on public education as
it allows each child to obtain more education. Hence, the benet of increas-
ing the current lump-sum tax becomes higher, and the threshold decreases.
When the rate of population growth is high, the realm where public policies
are sustained in the Markov perfect equilibrium shrinks, and the threshold
 is likely to be larger than . Therefore, the economy with a low level of
initial human capital and high population growth rate results in a poverty
trap. In contrast, when the population growth rate is low, the threshold  is
likely to be less than . In this case, regardless of initial human capital, the
economy will grow forever. This implies that a decline in population growth
can protect the economy from a poverty trap.
Next, we analyze the eects of the fraction x on the pattern of economic
development. The threshold  is shown to be decreasing in the fraction x:
@
@x
=
@
@g
@g
@x
=   R
(1  )(1  x)2(1 + n)g 1+

1
g
+
1
g
  1

< 0:
The intuition is similar to that of the comparative statics with respect to the
rate of population growth. A rise in the fraction allows each child to obtain
more public education without increasing the lump-sum tax. As a result, the
benet of increasing current lump-sum tax becomes higher, and the thresh-
old  becomes smaller. From this comparative statics, we obtain a policy
implication: even though the rate of population is high, if the government is
capable of setting the fraction x high, it can prevent the economy from being
caught in a poverty trap.
5 Conclusion
We consider an overlapping generations economy where the overall size of so-
cial security and public education are determined in a repeated voting game,
and investigate the interaction between the politically determined public poli-
cies and economic development. In contrast to the previous literature, we
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focus on a Markov perfect equilibrium as a politico-economic equilibrium.
Unlike previous literature, we can explicitly investigate how the overall size
of public policies depends on economic environment, and how these policies
aect the process of economic development.
In this paper, we obtain the following results. First, while public policies
are sustained in the Markov perfect equilibrium when the level of human
capital is suciently high, these policies cannot be sustained when the level
of human capital is low. Second, there are certain patterns to the process of
human capital accumulation. The economy with a high level of initial human
capital grows forever, whereas that with a low level of initial human capital
might be caught in a poverty trap.
We conclude this paper with the areas for possible further study. In
this paper, we assume that individuals are homogenous within each genera-
tion, and thus public policies do not redistribute income intragenerationally.
However, when considering the roles of these policies, it might be important
to investigate the intragenerational redistributive eects of these policies.
Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) analyze the interaction between public edu-
cation subsidies and income inequality in a political economy. Casamatta et
al. (2000) consider an overlapping generations model in which individuals are
heterogeneous with respect to their productivity and investigate the eects
of social security as an intergenerational and intragenerational income redis-
tribution policy. Furthermore, we assume a small open economy, and thus,
do not consider the eects of public policies on the process of physical capital
accumulation. As mentioned in standard textbooks such as Blanchard and
Fischer (1989), social security aects saving behaviors of individuals and the
process of physical capital accumulation. Lastly, we assume that the govern-
ment maintains a balanced budget. If it can issue public debt, it can prevent
the economy from being caught in a poverty trap by issuing public debt and
investing in public education.
6 Appendix : The Proof of Proposition 1
First, we guess that the equilibrium tax function in the next period is linear
with respect to the human capital in the next period:
 0 = 1 + 2G^(; h); (16)
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where 1 and 2 is unknown variables. Given (16), the function V is repre-
sented as
V (; h) = wh   + 1 1
g
+ 2
1
g
G^(; h);
and the rst order condition is
 1 + 2 1
g
@G^
@
(; h) = 0: (17)
Solving (17) with respect to  , we obtain
 =
1 + n
x
"
2
g
x
1 + n
 1
1 
h  
#
= 1 + 2h:
Comparing the coecients, we obtain
1 =  1 + n
x
 ; 2 =
1 + n
x
g
1
 : (18)
Here we set a candidate of an equilibrium tax function such that
^(h)  1 + n
x

g
1
h  

: (19)
However, it is obvious that the guess given by (19) is incorrect because the
value of ^(h) is negative when 0  h < =g 1 .
Next, we guess that the equilibrium tax in the next period is represented
as the following function
 0 =

0 if 0  G^(; h)  
^ [G^(; h)] if G^(; h) > 
; (20)
where  is a unknown variable. Given equation (20), the function V is
represented as
V (; h) =
(
V1(; h)  wh   if 0    (h)
V2(; h)  wh   + 1g 1+nx
h
g
1
 G^(; h)  
i
if (h) <   wh ;
where
(h)  1 + n
x
"

h1 
 1

  
#
:
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Note that, by solving the following equation @V2(; h)=@ = 0 with respect
to  , we obtain  = ^(h).
From the properties of the function ^ and  , we obtain the following
equivalence relation
^(h) > (h) () h > 
g
:
Furthermore, from the properties of the function V1 and V2, we obtain the
following equivalence relation
V2[^(h); h] > V1(0; h) () h > 
g
1


1  

1
g
  1

:
We set a candidate for  such that
 =

g
1


1  

1
g
  1

:
From the properties of the function ^ ,  ; V1; V2 and the candidate , we obtain
that:
(h)  ^(h) ; V1(0; h) > V2[^(h); h] if 0  h  g ;
(h) < ^(h) ; V1(0; h)  V2[^(h); h] if g < h  ;
(h) < ^(h) ; V1(0; h) < V2[^(h); h] if h > :
Figure 2(a), 2(b) and 2(c) depict the shape of the function V when 0 
h  =g, =g < h  , and h > , respectively. From these gures, it is
shown that:
  = 0 is optimal when 0  h  =g.
  = 0 is optimal when =g < h   6.
  = ^(h) is optimal when h > .
Therefore, if the equilibrium tax in the next period is given as equation (20),
the optimal tax is represented as
 =

0 if 0  h  
^(h) if h > 
:
This functional form is the same as (20), and thus (20) is shown to be a
Markov perfect equilibrium tax function.
6When h = ,  = 0 and  = ^(h) are indierent. For simplicity, we assume that  = 0
is chosen in this case.
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Figure 2: (a), (b) and (c) depict the shape of the function V when 0  ht 
=g, when =g < ht   and when ht > , respectively.
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